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FLORIDA EMPLOYMENT PEACE STATUTE-COMPELLING
UNION RECOGNITION
SAMUEL J. KANNER * AND JOHN P. CORCORAN, JR. **
With the increasing growth of industry in the State of Florida and the
resulting demand for labor, certain social and economic problems have arisen
which heretofore were prevalent only in large industrial areas. The most sig-
nificant of these problems is the growth of organized labor with the ever in-
creasing need for improved labor-management relations. The manifestation
of this is the increase in clashes between labor and management for the past
few years, particularly in the Dade County area. We have seen several bitter
strikes in the airlines, the newspapers, the building trades and the laundries,
with rumblings in various other fields. Labor-management problems are be-
coming ever nore important in the operation of industrial establishments, and
in vital need of solution.
It will be the purpose of this article to discuss the Florida Employment
Peace Statute and its limitations upon picketing and striking by a union to
compel its recognition by an employer as collective bargaining agent for his
employees.'
* Member Fla. Bar.
** Member New York and Florida Bar.
1. FLA. STAT., Chap. 481 (1941). The important provisions of Chapter 481 involved
in this article are :
"§ 481.03 Employees' right of self-organization.-Employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
"§ 481.09 Right of franchise preserved; penalties.-It shall be unlawful for any
person:(1) To interfere with or prevent the right of franchise of any member of a labor
organization. The right of franchise shall include the right of an employee to make
complaint, file charges, give information or testimony concerning the violations of this
chapter, or the petitioiiing to his union regarding any grievance he may have concerning
his membership or employment, or the making known facts concerning such grievance
or violations of law to any public officials, and his right of free petition, lawful assemblage
and free speech.
(2) To prohibit or prevent any election of the officers of any labor organization.
(3) To participate in any strike, walkout, or cessation of work or cntinuation
thereof without the same being authorized by a majority vote of the employees to be
governed thereby; provided, that this shall not prohibit any person from terminating
his employment of his own volition.
(4) To conduct any election referred to in subsection (3) of this section without
a secret ballot.
(5) To charge, receive, or retain any dues, assessments or other charges in excess,
of, or not authorized by, the constitution or bylaws of any labor organization.
(6) To act as a business agent without having obtained and possessing a valid
and subsisting license or permit.
(7) To solicit membership for or to act as a representative of an existing labor
organization without authority of such labor organization to do so.
(8) To make any false statement in an application for a license.
(9) For any person to seize or occupy property unlawfully during the existence
of a labor dispute.
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The various branches of our state government, being cognizant of the
welfare of Florida and the necessity for increase in the industry brought into
this great state, have been concerned with these problems. The executive
branch of our government, acting through a militant attorney general and with
the aid of the public opinion of Florida, brought about an amendment to the
Florida Constitution, the so-called Right-To-Work-Amendment. Subsequently,
the legislative branch of our government, in answer to an ever increasing
clamor of public opinion, brought about the passage of the Florida Employ-
ment Peace Statute. The effect of this constitutional amendment and the
Florida Employment Peace Statute upon the labor problems existing in this
state now hangs in the balance, depending upon its interpretation by our
judicial branch, the Supreme Court of the State of Florida.
The principal causes of labor disturbances arise out of the refusal of
management to recognize a particular union as a collective bargaining agent
for employees, and a further refusal to sign a contract with the union as col-
lective bargaining agent for the employees. The Florida Supreme Court in
the past two years has had three instances of litigation arising out of the re-
fusal of management to recognize the union as a collective bargaining agent
for employees. These are Whitehead v. Miami Laundry,2 Moore v. City Dry
Cleaners & Laundry,3 and Johnson v. White Swan Laundry.4 These cases all
involve the same industry, and for the first time the Florida Supreme Court
had occasion to consider the application of the important provisions of the
Florida Employment Peace Statute, enacted by the Legislature in 1943.1
This statute is designed to protect labor unions, employers and non-union
workers. It laid down some rules for employers, employees and unions alike.
Section 481.03 guaranteed the right of self-organization to the laboring man.
He is insured of the right to bargain collectively through representatives of his
own choosing. Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of
the State of Florida was amended by the Legislature in 1943 and subsequently
(10) To cause any cessation of work or interference with the progress of work
by reason of any jurisdictional dispute, grievance or disagreement between or within
labor organizations.
(11) To coerce or intimidate any employee in the enjoyment of his legal rights,
- including those guaranteed in See. 481.03, or to intimidate his family, picket his
domicile, or injure the person or property of such employee or his family.
(12) To picket beyond the area of the industry within which a labor dispute
arises.
(13) To engage in picketing by force and violence, or to picket in such a manner
as to prevent ingress and egress to and from any premises, or to picket other than in
a reasonable and peaceable manner.
"§ 481.13 Right to strike preserved.-Except as specifically provided in this
chapter, nothing therein shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish
in any way the right to strike or the right of individuals to work; nor shall anything in
this chapter be so construed as to invade unlawfully the right to freedom of speech."
2. 160 Fla. 667, 36 So.2d 382 (1948).
3. 41 So.2d 865 (1949).
4. 41 So.2d 874 (1949).
5. Supra, note 1.
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adopted by the people of the State of Florida.0 This amendment provided
that the right of persons to work should not be denied or abridged on account
of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization,
and further that the same should not be construed to deny or abridge the right
of employees by and-through a labor organization or union to bargain collec-
tively with their employers.
The most controversial part of Chapter 481 is focused on the provisions
of Section 481.09, which section makes it unlawful to participate in any strike,
walk-out or cessation of work without the strike or walk-out being authorized
by a majority vote of the employees involved, with the limitation, however,
that no person can be prohibited from terminating his employment as a result
of his own volition. This section also provides that all elections with reference
to a strike shall be by secret ballot. The same section permits picketing provided
it is done in a reasonable and peaceable manner, but further provides that it is
unlawful to coerce or intimidate any employee in the enjoyment of his legal
rights, including those provided in Section 481.03, namely, the right of an
employee to bargain through representatives of his own choosing.
The pattern of union organization in the laundry cases above quoted is as
follows: The union calls upon the employer and demands that it sign a contract
recognizing the union as a collective bargaining agent for its employees. The
employer generally refuses to negotiate such a contract unless the union
actually represents a majority of the employees. The union in the process of
organizing the employees is not in a strategic position to insist upon an imme-
diate strike vote to be held in the company plant by secret ballot, since it does
not represent a majority of the employees. It therefore organizes a picket line
around the company plant announcing that the plant is on strike, publishes
information through radio and press that the company plant is closed down
and attempts to pass out handbills instructing those workers desirous of enter-
ing the plant that a strike exists.
Some workers then fail to continue their employment during the duration
of the picket line for one or two reasons, either because of the actual coercion
of the picket line (and this coercion in the great number of instances is far
short of the violence which would be recognizable as necessary to obtain in-
junctive relief), or adherence to the policy of never crossing the picket line.
There is no question about the legality of a strike if a majority of the em-
ployees involved join in the strike pursuant to a vote by secret ballot. The
problem confronting the employer is what to do with his establishment in
6. FLA. CoNsT., DECLA ItON o RIGHTS, § 12. The amended portion reads, "The
right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or
non-membership in any labor union, or labor organization; provided, that this clause
shall not be construed to deny or abridge the right of employees by and through a labor
organization or labor union to bargain collectively with their employer."
7. See Moore v. City Dry Cleaners and Laundry, 41 So.2d 865 (1949) and the
cases cited at p. 870.
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which the majority of the elmployees are still willing to work. His business is
depressed and seriously affected by the false advertising and publicity to the
effect that his plant has shut down. There is a general boycott of his establish-
ment by the people who will not cross the picket line. This result is brought
about by a union which requests recognition, but which does not represent a
majority of the employees. By the abortive strike and coercion of the picket
line and its conduct it seeks to force recognition upon the employer and the
employer's coercion of the employees to join the union. Few, if any, of the em-
ployees may desire this union as their collective bargaining agent. If the em-
ployer signs the contract with the union recognizing it as the collective bar-
gaining agent of the employees, he violates Section 481.03 giving his employees
the right to bargain collectively with representatives of the employees' own
choosing.
The employer seeks recourse from his dilemma in the courts. He peti-
tions the Circuit Court for an injunction against the union enjoining it from
calling the illegal strike on the ground that it has not been authorized by a
majority of his employees, and asks for relief against the picketing of his
plant for the purpose of advertising the illegal strike. Heretofore, the Circuit
Courts have been granting the strike injunctions, including an injunction
against picketing in connection with illegal strikes. In Whitehead v. Miami
Laundry," the Florida Supreme Court reversed a Circuit Court injunction
granting the employer relief against picketing and reversing a former de-
cision 0 made prior to the enactment of the Florida Labor Peace Statute.
THE LAW PRIOR TO ENACTMENT OF THE FLORIDA EMPLOYMENT
PEACE STATUTE
In Retail Clerks' Union v. Lerner Shops,10 the union had been enjoined
from picketing the place of business of Lerner Shops. The evidence showed
that there was no controversy between Lerner and its employees with refer-
ence to hours, working conditions or recognition of the union as a bargaining
agent. The sole purpose of picketing was to compel the Lerner Shops to recog-
nize the union as a bargaining agent for its employees and to compel the
employees to become union members. The Florida Supreme Court in affirming
the injunction emphasized that there was no conclusive showing that the em-
ployees desired to unite with the union or that an obstacle was interposed to
their so doing. The Court further emphasized that "Peaceful picketing will
not be permitted for the purpose of dictating the policy of an owner's business,
to determine whom he will employ or to intimidate him in the management of
8. Supro, note 2.
9. Retail Clerks' Union v. Lerler Shops, 140 Fla. 865, 193 So. 529 (1939).
10. Ibid. See also ParamoLunt Enterprises, Ic. v. Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 140 So.
328 (1932), in which the Florida Supreme Court stated that as a general rule peaceful
picketing was permitted.
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his business." The Court recognized that a labor organization might picket for
certain purposes, but the coercion of recognition as bargaining agent was not
one of those purposes.
The Industrial Peace Statute and Its Interpretations
With this background, the Legislature of the State of Florida enacted
Chapter 481 to insure industrial peace against abortive strikes by small minori-
ties in a collective bargaining unit. The act provides that it shall be illegal to
participate in a strike without a majority of the employees involved authorizing
such a strike by secret ballot. It further provides that the employees are en-
titled to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
In Whitehead v. Miami Laundry, Inc.,'1 the following factual situation
existed: Whitehead was the business agent of the local International Laundry
Workers Union. The company had 210 persons employed by it. The union
had been attempting to organize its workers for a long time by holding meet-
ings and by propagandizing the employees via mail and the distribution of
handbills. The union had never represented a majority of the company em-
ployees nor had a majority of the employees ever designated the union as a
collective bargaining agent. On May 12, 1947, former employees picketed the
company's plant with placards stating the Miami Laundry was unfair to its
employees. On the same date the Miami newspapers carried purported news
releases that the union represented the workers and had called a strike to be
effective May 16th at 6:30 a.m. However, all but a few of the company's
employees appeared for work (luring the entire period of the so-called strike.
The pickets were working with and had been paid by the union. The-Circuit
Court, after hearing the testimony, ruled that the defendant union was acting
in a concerted effort to bring about a cessation of work at plaintiff's place of
business and was therefore acting in contravention of the state law by inducing
a strike in the absence of a majority vote of the employees involved authorizing
the strike. The final decree enjoined the defendaht from repeating acts of in-
ducing, signalling or announcing a strike at the laundry's place of business.
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower court on the theory that
there was no strike or cessation of work within the purview of the requirement
of Section 481.09(3) requiring a majority vote of the employees for a legal
strike. The Court further emphasized that Section 481.09 did permit picketing.
However, the sole purpose of the picketing amid union activity in the instant
case was to compel the employer laundry to negotiate with union representa-
tives with respect to a collective bargaining agreement. The employer, Miami
Laundry, could not lawfully negotiate a contract with the union as collective
bargaining agent for its employees in view of Section 481.03, which gave the
11. Supra, note 2,
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employees the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing. Section 481.09(11 ) states that it shall be unlawful to coerce or
intimidate an employee in the enjoyment of his legal rights including those
guaranteed in Section 481.03.12 In other words, the employees of the laundry
would be disenfranchised and have no choice in the selection of their collective
bargaining agent if the employer recognized the union. Chapter 481 of the
Florida Statutes establishes the public policy of the State of Florida to the
effect that a majority of the employees are entitled to determine who their
collective bargaining agent should be. The attempt of the union to foist itself
upon a group of employees and compel the employer to recognize it as the
bargaining agent is a type of coercion similar to that of the employer insisting
that his employees join a company union of his own designation.
The principle upon which collective bargaining operates is that the rule
of the majority within an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall bind
the minority.
As is succinctly stated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Hotel and
Restaurant Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,'3 "If the
majority of a collective bargaining unit can coerce the minority in the matter
of bargaining, we see no reason why the Legislature may not vest in a majority
of the unit power to determine whether such conditions obtain in the employ-
ment as warrant the calling of a strike in an effort to remedy them."
The Florida Legislature certainly did not intend to permit picketing for
an illegal purpose. There is no doubt that the Legislature in enacting Chapter
481 F.S.A. recognized the right of peaceful picketing. This does not mean
the right to picket exists for all purposes no matter how peaceful the picketing
may be.
The picketing of the Miami Laundry and conduct of the union was for
an illegal purpose (1) to induce the employees of the Miami Laundry to
strike regardless of participation by a majority in the strike, and (2) to com-
pel the employer to recognize the union as the collective bargaining agent of
the employees, notwithstanding that the union did not renresent a majority of
the employees.
The Taft-Hartley Act specifically provides that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of em-
ployment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization unless it is representative of the ma-
jority of the employees.' 4 The Taft-Hartley Act states that the representatives
12. Supra, note 1.
13,. 236 Wis. 329, 294 N.W. 632 at p. 640 (1941) ; aff'd by U.S. Supreme Court
at 315 U.S. 437 (1942).
14. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley) 61 Stat. 136,
c. 120, 29 U.S.C. § 141-197. Sec. 8(a) 3 provides:
"(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-,
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selected by the majority of the employees shall be the exclusive representa-
tives of all employees for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to
rates of pay, hours of employment or other conditions of employment. 15
In other words, the whole legislative trend is toward self-government in
industry and labor-management relations conducted by representatives of the
majority of employees.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that peaceful picketing
for an unlawful purpose may be enjoined. These decisions were made after
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Thornhill v. Alabama,'6
and A.F. of L. v. Swing,17 relied upon by the Florida Supreme Court in
Whitehead v. Miami Laundry Company. The celebrated Swing and Thornhill
cases sustained picketing as a mode of free speech and the ban on picketing
inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of speech under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. In the Swing case the sole issue was
the validity of a decree asserting as the common law of a state that there can
be no peaceful picketing or peaceful persuasion with reference to a dispute
between an employer and a trade union unless the employer's own employees
are in controversy with him. The Supreme Court conceded, however, that the
states may still "set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial com-
batants."
In Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co.,'" decided April 4, 1949, the
United States Supreme Court reiterated the statement that conduct otherwise
unlawful is not immune to state regulation "because an integral part of that
conduct is carried on by display of placards by peaceful picketers." In this case
the facts were as follows: An ice peddlers' union sought to break down the re-
sistance of non-member peddlers in their efforts to force them to join the
union for so-called better wages and working conditions by inducing wholesale
distributors to agree not to sell ice to non-union peddlers. Such an agreement
was illegal under a state statute declaring combinations in restraint of trade
(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in § 7 (§ 157 of this title) ;(2) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided, That nothing . . . shall preclude an employer from making
an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a.condition of employment
membership therein ". . . if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees as provided in § 9(a), . . . in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit
covered by such agreement when made.
15. ibid. § 9(a) provides:
"(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions
of employment : .... "
16. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
17. 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
18. 336 U.S. 490 (1949). This case represents the first instance Justices Reed, Black
and Douglas have voted to uphold an injunction against picketing since 1940, when the
Thornhill doctrine was expounded, 63 HARV. L. Rnv. 155.
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to be unlawful. A distributor refused to agree and the union resorted to
peaceful picketing. In a suit to enjoin the picketing the union asserted that
they were merely exercising their constitutional right to publicize the existence
of a labor dispute. The United States Supreme Court upheld the injunction
against picketing. The picketing in violation of the statute and express public
policy, was not within the immunity of the constitutional freedom of speech
and press. No opinions relied upon by the petitioners give a right to picketers
to take advantage of speech or press to violate valid state laws designed to pro-
tect important interests of society. In other words, the states still have an im-
portant legislative field in the regulation of picketing. The Florida Legislature
has spoken in this field in the adoption of Florida Industrial Peace Statute,
but the decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Whitehead v. Miami Laundry
invalidated this. In striking down this legislative labor policy, the Supreme
Court of Florida failed to consider the State Legislature's right to create
limitations in the public interest. The facts in the Whitehead case show that
the union was attempting to induce conduct in violation of (1) the right of
employees involved to choose their own bargaining agents, and (2) the re-
quireinent that a strike vote be authorized by a majority of employees involved.
Two strong legislative policies, and yet the Florida Supreme Court adhered to
what they recognized as federal constitutional limitation, notwithstanding the
clear position taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Giboney case and others,1 9 decided subsequent to the Thorn/hill and Swing
cases relied upon in the Whitehead case.
Decisions of the highest state courts of other states clearly indicate that
picketing for an illegal purpose may be enjoined:
In Wolfernman v. Root,20 a substantially similar situation confronted the
Missouri Supreme Court as confronted the Florida Supreme Court in White-
head v. Miami Laundry Company. The union was attempting to obtain a
contract from the company, contending that it was the collective bargaining
agent and represented a majority of the employees. The plaintiff company
refused to sign the contract because the union did not represent a majority
of the employees. The union set up a picket line about the company's place
of business. The plaintiff filed a petition for an injunction to restrain picketing
on the ground that it was being carried on for an unlawful purpose; namely,
to coerce the plaintiff into signing a contract with defendant union and to
force plaintiff to coerce its employees into joining the defendant union. The
final decree enjoined the union (1) from demanding the company to enter
into an agreement with the union so long as the local union did not represent
a majority of the meat-cutters and butchers in the employ of the plaintiff,
19. Sn pro, note 18. Other decisions indicating the weight given to legislative policy
are Carpenters and J. Union of America v. Ritters Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); Bakery
Drivers Local v. WobL 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
20. 356 Mo. 976, 204 S.W.2d 733 (1947).
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and (2) from announcing, publishing or declaring that a strike was in effect
at plaintiff's store when such was not the case. The Missouri Supreme Court
ruled that picketing should also have been enjoined. The Court conceded that
one of the lawful purposes of picketing was to inform the public that plaintiff's
employees refused to join the union. This, however, was joined with a purpose
to force the company to sign a contract with the union which was an unlaw-
ful purpose. Picketing for an unlawful purpose as well as a lawful purpose
renders the picketing unlawful. 21 The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari in this case. 2
Again in R. H. White Co. v. Murphy, 3 the Massachusetts Supreme
Court ruled that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech does not
protect picketing when the purpose of the picketing is to coerce employer or
employee action which would be in violation of the State Labor Relations Act:
THE REQUIREMENT OF AUTHORIZATION OF A MAJORITY VOTE BY
SECRET BALLOT AS THE CONDITION PRECEDENT TO A STRIKE.
The Florida Supreme Court, subsequent to Whitehead v. Miami
Laundry, has had two other occasions to pass on the question of picketing by
a union which did not represent a majority of the employees, in order to
compel recognition as the collective bargaining agent and a contract, Moore
v. City Dry Cleaners and Laundry,2 -4 and Johnson z. The White Swan
Laundry.2 5
In each of these cases, the conduct of the union was substantially identi-
cal with that in the Whitehead v. Miami Laundry case.26 The union did not
represent a majority of the -employees. It did, however, in the City Dry
Cleaners case attempt an abortive strike election but, as the Chancellor found,
the majority of the employees had not participated in any secret ballot nor
had there been compliance with the statute with reference to balloting by a
majority involved. However, in each of the cases the union set up pickets
around the plants and advertised that a strike was in progress and the plant
21. Supra, note. 20, p. 736: "Both the answer and the evidence do disclose that one
of the purposes for the picketing is for giving information to the public. While we assume
that purpose is lawful still when it is coupled, as it is here, with unlawful purposes, the
fact one of several purposes is lawful does not make the picketing lawful. Picketing for
both lawful and unlawful purposes is unlawful. See RESTATEMIENT TORTS, 796 (1939),
C. Bausch Machine Tool Co. v. Hill, 231 Mass. 30, 120 N.E. 188 (1918); Folsom
Engraving Co. v. McNeil, 235 Mass. 269, 126 N.E. 479 (1920)."
22. Ibid. 333 U.S. 837 (1948).
23. 310 Mass. 510, 38 N.E.2d 685 (1942). The Court stated at page 691: "We are
of the opinion that none of the.cases relied upon by the defendants . . . . is authority
for any principle that picketing in concert to persuade an employer to do an unlawful act,
one condemned by statute as an unfair labor practice and contrary to the defined public
policy of the commonwealth and of the nation, is permissible under the guarantee of
freedom of speech or otherwise."
24. 41 So.2d 865 (1949).
25. 41 So.2d 874 (1949).
26. Supra, note 2.
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was shut down. In the case of Moore v. City Dry Cleaners and Laundry
violence accompanied the union picketing and the injunctive relief was ob-
viously proper and in line with United States Supreme Court decision, Milk-
wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies.27 The Florida Supreme Court
so ruled. However, in Johnson v. White Swan Laundry the primary grounds,
and one of the grounds in the City Dry Cleaners case, for the injunction
against picketing by the union and advertising the existence of a strike was
the failure to comply with the requirement of authorization by a majority
of the employees involved. The following questions were squarely presented
to the Florida Supreme Court: (1) Is Section 481.09 (3-4)2E constitutional
as a proper exercise of the state police power in requiring a nmjority of the
employees involved to authorize the strike? (2) Is picketing and announcing
a strike in contravention of a state statute picketing for an illegal purpose
and subject to injunctive relief ? The Supreme Court did not decide either
question in either case. It failed to decide both issues, and in interpreting Sec-
tion 481.09 (3-4) stated that since there had been no actual walk-out. no
question of a majority vote was involved, The majority vote is only a con-
dition precedent to the act of striking itself and not applicable to picketing to
induce employees to walk out or strike. It seems obvious that picketing for
an illegal purpose in contravention of the state statute and state legislative
policy is picketing which may be enjoined. It does not materially differ as
a practical matter whether a minority of employees cease work as a result
of a strike or whether they cease work because they do not care to cross a
picket line or are otherwise coerced. The legislative policy is obvious. In
any strike there are three groups involved, the employer, the employees and
the public. The Legislature in the public interest has promulgated certain
conditions with reference to a strike. The dissent pointed out the effect of the
holding in both cases as implying a right to announce an existing strike
which could not then have lawfully occurred or to induce an act prohibited
by Section 481.09 (3). 29
It is submitted that the clear cut holding in the Giboney case,3 0 per-
mitting states to enjoin picketing for a purpose in contravention of state
legislative policy would justify a complete reversal of Whitehead v. Miami
Laundry Company.
There is no question of the constitutionality of the requirement that
27. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
28. Supra, note 1.
29. Supra, note 1. 41 So.2d 874 at page 877 (1949): "The effect of this holding is
that under the circumstances of the case a strike might offend § 481.09(3) supra,
yet the appellants 'may lawfully invite, induce, signal or announce a strike at any place
of business' when it had not been voted 'by a majority of the employees to be governed
thereby,' which implies a right to announce as existing a strike which could not then
have lawfully occurred or to induce an act prohibited by § 481.09(3), supra, i.e., before
a majority had voted in favor of a strike."
30. Supra, note 18.
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a strike be authorized by a majority vote of the employees involved at a secret
ballot. This is a valid statutory policy set forth by the Legislature of the
State of Florida. It does not contravene any provision of the state or federal
constitution. The Taft-Hartley Labor Management Relations Act specifi-
cally outlawed certain forms of strikes by unions. Strikes to obtain named ob-
jectives are made unfair labor practices a' and the National Labor Rela-
tions Board is authorized to prevent them.3 2 There is no absolute right to
strike.
The recent United States Supreme Court case of International Union
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,3a decided February, 1949, had
occasion to discuss the authority of the states to regulate and control strikes.
The U.A.W., for the purpose of putting pressure on the employer in ne-
goti ations for a new collective bargaining agreement, instigated intermittent
and unannounced work stoppages without warning during working hours.
The Wisconsin Board issued a cease and desist order predicated on the Wis-
consin Statute, which made it an unfair labor practice (1) to engage in
picketing, or other overt concomitants of a strike without the same being
authorized by a majority of the collective bargaining unit by secret ballot
calling for a strike, and (2) to engage in any concerted action to interfere
with production except by leaving the premises to go on strike. The United
States Supreme Court stated that the order to cease and desist was within
the proper purview of state regulation of strikes. The Court reviewed the
existing law and history of the right to strike: .4
This Court less than a decade earlier had stated that law to be that the
state constitutionally could prohibit strikes and make a violation criminal.
It has unanimously adopted the language of Mr. Justice Brandeis that
"Neither the commoh law, nor the Fourteenth Amendment, confers the
absolute right to strike." Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311, 71 L. ed. 248,
269, 47 S. Ct. 86.... The right to strike, because of its more serious impact
upon the public interest, is more vulnerable to regulation than the right to
organize and select representatives for lawful purposes of collective bar-
gaining which this Court has characterized as a "fundamental right" and
which, as the Court has pointed out, was recognized as such in its decisions
long before it was given protection by the Labor Relations Act.
The Court then summarized the respective spheres of the states and
31. Supra, note 14. § 8(b) (4) provides: "to engage in, or to induce or en-
courage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in
the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services, where an object thereof is :" (stating named objectives).
32. Id. § 10(a) provides: "The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice listed in § 8, § 158
of this title affecting commerce."
33. 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
34. Id. at 259.
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federal government under the Labor Management Relations Act 5 (Taft-
Hartley) :
It never has been thought to prevent the state legislatures from limiting
"individual and group rights of aggression and defense" or from substitut-
ing "processes of justice for the more primitive method of trial by combat."
* . . The Labor Management Relations Act declared it to be an unfair
labor practice for a union to induce or engage in a strike or concerted re-
fusal to work where an object thereof is any of certain enumerated ones.
. . . While the Federal Board is empowered to forbid a strike, when
and because its purpose is one that the Federal Act made illegal, it has
been given no power to forbid one because its method is illegal-even if
the illegality were to consist of actual or threatened violence to persons or
destruction of property. Policing of such conduct is left wholly to the
states. In this case there was also evidence of considerable injury to prop-
erty and intimidation of other employees by threats and no one questions
the state's power to police coercion by those methods.
The decision would clearly indicate the law with reference to the
right of the state legislature to place reasonable limitations on the right
to strike. The Wisconsin Statute requiring a majority vote by secret ballot
as a condition precedent to striking had been before the United States
Supreme Court on a previous occasion and seemingly approved by that
Court which quoted the statute in its decision. In this case, Hotel and Restau-
rant Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board 36 the United
States Supreme Court was confronted by an appeal from a decision of the
Wisconsin Board, affirmed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court 37 on the ground
that the Wisconsin Labor Peace Statute and the decisions of the Board
forbade the union to engage in peaceful picketing insofar as it was deemed
in exercise oS free speech. There had admittedly been violence in the union
picketing. However, the United States Supreme Court seemingly quoted
the Wisconsin Labor Peace Statute with approval including the prohibition
against picketing other concomitants of a strike without the authorization of
a majority of the collective bargaining unit as within the proper scope of state
legislative action.36 The decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court appealed
35. Id. at 252.
36. 315 U.S. 437 (1944).
37. Supra, note 13.
38. Supra, 315 U.S. 439 (1941): "The Wisconsin statute underlying this contro-
versy was enacted as a comprehensive code governing the relations * (440) *between em-
ployers and employees in the state. Only a few of its many provisions are relevant here.
§ 111.06 provides that it shall be 'an unfair labor practice' to 'cooperate in engaging
in, promoting or inducing picketing, boycotting or any other overt concomitant of a strike
unless a majority in a collective bargaining unit of the employees of an employer against
whom such acts are primarily directed have voted by secret ballot to call a strike,' and to
'hinder or prevent, by mass picketing, threats, intimidation, force or coercion of any kind
the pursuit of any lawful work or employment, or to obstruct or interfere with entrance to
or egress from any place of employment, or to obstruct or interfere with free and un-
interrupted use of public roads, streets, highways, railways, airports, or other ways of
travel or conveyance.'
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from had emphasized that it is within the providence of the legislature
to place it within the power of a majority of a collective bargaining unit to
authorize a strike. The Court summarized the logical rules :9
The petitioners complain that the characterization of the acts of em-
ployees as unfair labor practices cannot be made to depend on the action
of a majority of a collective bargaining unit; that the legislature cannot
place it within the power of a majority of a collective bargaining unit to
authorize a strike. This argument -is an attack upon a principle which is
fundamental in the attempt of the legislature and of Congress to regulate
labor relations. The principle upon which authorized collective bargaining
depends is that the rule of the majority within an appropriate collective
bargaining unit shall bind the minority. We see no way by which the
principle of collective bargaining can be maintained unless this right of
a majority of a collective bargaining unit to speak for the unit including
the minority is maintained. A bargain on behalf of a collective bargaining
unit amounts to nothing if, after it is made, the individuals or some of them
comprising that unit are not affected thereby. This principle is explicit in
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 151, et seq., in the
Railway Labor Peace -Act, 45 U.S.C.A. 151, et seq., and in the act
now under consideration. If the majority of a collective bargaining unit
can thus coerce the minority in the matter of bargaining, we see no reason
why the legislature may not vest in a majority of the unit power to de-
termine whether such conditions obtain in the employment as warrant the
calling of a strike in an effort to remedy them.
The cases primarily relied upon in support of the proposition that
the state legislature cannot delegate to and confine to a majority of a col-
lective bargaining unit the power to authorize a strike are A.F. of L. v. Bain40
and A.F. of L. v. McAdoryA'
The cae of A.F. of L. v. Bain did not involve a statute such as the
one in Florida limiting the right to strike except by a majority of the em-
ployees involved authorizing same at secret ballot. The statute 42 involved
limited all picketing in the absence of a bona fide labor dispute between
the employees and their employer, a statutory prohibition which is expressly
within the decisions of the Thornhill and Suing cases. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Hotel and Restauwant Employees v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Board,4 3 conclusively distinguished the case of A.F. of L. v. Bain
in view of the fact the statute involved went so much farther than the mere
statutory limitation of the right to strike without majority authorization.
The other case relied upon by those who urge the unconstitutionality of
39. Supra, note 13, 294 N.W. 632 at 640 (1941).
40. 165 Ore. 183, 106 P.2d 544 (1940).
41. 246 Ala. 1, 18 So.2d 810 (1944).
42. OREGON LAWS 1939, Ch. 2. P. 7, § 3 provides, "It shall be unlawful for any
person, persons, association or organizations to picket or patrol or post pickets or patrols
in or near the premises or property owned, occupied, controlled or used by an employer
or employers unless there is a bona fide labor dispute between said employer and/or
employers and his or their employees."
43. Supra, note 13.
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Section 489.09 (3-4) is the case of A.F. of L. v. McAdory..4 This was an ap-
peal to the Alabama Supreme Court in an action for a declaratory decree with
reference to the constitutionality of the provisions of the Alabama Labor
Peace Act known as the "Bradford Act." This case involved a statute making
it unlawful to strike except when it is authorized by a vote of the majority
of the regular employees working in the business or plant involved.
The Alabama Supreme Court ruled the Act unconstitutional solely because it
failed to limit the strike to a strike authorized by a majority of the collective
bargaining unit. The Alabama Supreme Court quoted with approval the Wis-
consin Supreme Court decision, 45 and implied.that if the Alabama Statute fol-
lowed the phraseology of the Wisconsin Labor Peace Statute, the Statute
would be valid. The distinction drawn by the Alabama Supreme Court is
fundamental in understanding union organization in this country. In a large
industrial establishment, there may be several A.F. of L. craft unions all
working side by side and all comprising independent collective bargaining
units. There may also be a C.T.O. Industrial Union representing the unskilled
workers. The collective bargaining unit of A.F. of L. craft unions does
not need to rely upon the majority vote of the entire plant to strike. The
majority vote of the craft union members or bargaining unit members is
the important criterion of the Wisconsin Statute and of the Florida Statute.
The Florida Statute46 reads that the strike is illegal unless authorized by a
majority vote of the employees to be governed thereby. This undoobtedly
means a majority of the particular collective bargaining unit. A specific
example of how this would operate may be made with reference to a large
chain of super markets. The butchers belong to an independent union and
to an independent bargaining unit. If a butchers' strike was authorized by
a majority of the butchers, there is no hesitancy in calling it a legal strike.
The majority of the other employees would not be called upon to vote in
the strike vote unless, of course, they had become members of the particular
union striking.
The most recent decision with reference to the legality of a state legis-
lative provision making the calling of a strike conditioned upon a mdjority
vote of the collective bargaining unit involved is International U.A.W. v.
McNally. 47 The action involved an attempt by the U.A.W.-C.IYO. auto
44. Suqpra, note 41.
45, Id. at 22, 18 So.2d 827 (1944). "The Court there observed: 'The principle up-
on which authorized collective bargaining depends is that the rule of the majority within
an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall bind the minority.' ,
The Wisconsin Court recognized this principle and gave it effect in upholding the
Wisconsin statute, but we have no such provision in the Act here under consideration.
The denial of the right to strike is made to rest, not upon the rule of the majority of any
bargaining unit or in any craft to which the workmen belong, but upon the whim or
caprice of others who may be employed in the business, plant, or unit thereof, whoever
they may be and whatever views they may entertain as to labor or labor unions."
46. Supra, note 1.
47. 325 Mich. 250, 38 N.W.2d 421 (1949).
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workers to enjoin prosecution under a Michigan statute which provided
that in the event of a labor controversy, before a strike may be called, an
election shall be held and the strike shall not be instituted unless a majority
of all employees in such bargaining unit vote in favor of such action. The
U.A.W. contended that insofar as the statute made the calling of a strike
conditioned on the affirmative vote of the majority of employees involved in
the bargaining unit it violated the Michigan State Constitution, and was re-
pugnant to the right of collective bargaining granted to unions under Taft-
Hartley. The Michigan Supreme Court in a clear cut and well considered
opinion held that this statute limiting the right to strike to authorization by a
majority of a collective bargaining unit by a secret ballot was clearly within
the purview of the legislature. The court easily distinguished A.F. of L. v.
Bain,48 and A.F. of L. v. McAdory 41 in much the same manner as they have
been distinguished here.
The opinion followed the U. S. Supreme Court decision in International
U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,50 which clearly indi-
cates that the state may limit the right to strike in the exercise of its police
power, I t emphasized that the public is a third party interested in strikes and
can regulate same.
Three other cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1949
emphasize that reasonable state legislative policy not in conflict with the Fed-
eral Statutes does not conflict with the provisions of the Federal Constitution.
These cases are: Lincoln Federal Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal
Co..5 ' American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Company 2
and Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin Ernploysnent Relations Board.'3
In the Lincoln Federal Labor Union case, the United States Supreme
Court was confronted with a constitutional amendment of Nebraska and a
North Carolina statute similar to the right to work amendment of the Florida
Constitution, Section 12 of the Bill of Rights passed by the Legislature
in 1943 and ratified by the electorate in 1944.54 In substance the provisions
which were the subject of the judicial inquiry provided that no one should
be denied an opportunity to obtain employment because he is or is not a
member of a labor organization. The legislation was declared to be consti-
tutional. The Supreme Court emphasized :15
Under the state policy adopted by these laws, employers must, other
considerations being equal, give equal opportunities for remunerative work
48. Supra, note 40.
49. Supra, note 41.
50. Supra, note 33.
51. 335 US. 525 (1949).
52. 335 U.S. 538 (1949).
53. 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
54. Supra, note 6.
55. Supra, note 51, at 529.
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to union and non-union members without discrimination against either.
In order to achieve this objective of equal opportunity for the two groups,
employers are forbidden to make contracts which would obligate them to
hire or keep none but union members.
These state laws also make it impossible for an employer. to make con-
tracts with company unions which obligated the employer to refuse jobs to
union members. In this respect the state laws protect the employment oppor-
tunities of members of independent unions. The Court then emphasized the
broad sphere of operation of the legislature both state and federal in the
field of labor legislation under the present constitutional doctrine: 56
Under this constitutional doctrine the due process clause is no longer
to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state legislatures are put
in a strait jacket when they attempt to suppress business and industrial
conditions which they regard as offensive to the public welfare.
In A.F. of L. v. American Sash & Door Company 57 involving a sub-
stantially similar "right to work" statute of the Arizona Constitution, the
United States Supreme Court in affirming the validity of the constitutional
amendment expressly stated: s
• . concerning state laws we have said that the existence of evils
against which the law should afford protection and the relative need of
different groups for that protection "is a matter for the legislative judg-
ment."
The third case, Algomca Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board,5 9 decided March 7, 1949, is even more interesting because it
sheds some light on the Florida legislative policy making it illegal to strike
or participate in a strike without the authorization of the majority taken by
a secret ballot. The Wisconsin Statute provided that an employer could not
encourage memberships in any union by discrimination as to hiring except
that an all-union agreement was permissible if voted for by two-thirds of
the employees at a secret ballot. In other words, the union closed shop
agreement must have had the sanction of two-thirds of the employees voting
by a secret ballot. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board had ordered
an employer to cease giving effect to a maintenance of membership clause in a
collective bargaining agreement, and ordered reinstatement of an employee
discharged for failure to pay union dues on the ground the employer had
committed an unfair labor practice in making such an agreement without
the sanction of two-thirds of the employees. The Supreme Court in affirming
the action of the Wisconsin Employment Board stated: 60
56. Id. at 536.
57. Supra, note 52.
58. Id. at 542.
59. Supra, note 53.
60. Id. at 305.
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The States are free (apart from preemption by Congress) to char-
acterize any wrong of any kind by an employer to an employee, whether
statutorily created or known to the common law, as an "unfair labor prac-
tice."
The employer had argued that the Wisconsin statute contravened the
National Labor Relations Act in effect at the time of the order of the Wis-
consin Employment Board, which permitted the closed shop. The Court, how-
ever, held that the National Labor Relations Act, predecessor to Taft-Hart-
ley, merely permitted the closed shop, merely "disclaimed a national policy
hostile to the closed shop or other forms of union-security agreement." The
United States Supreme Court reiterated that the state jurisdiction over labor
controversies is unimpaired where State and Federal laws do not overlap: 6t
Since the enumeration by the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act
of unfair labor practices over which the National Board has exclusivejurisdiction does not prevent the States from enforcing their own policies
in matters not governed by the federal law, such freedom of action by a
State cannot be lost because the National Board has once held an election
under the Wagner Act.
CONCLUSION
In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
qualifying their previous decisions in the Thornhill and Swing cases with
reference to picketing, there can be little doubt that the power is reserved to
the various state legislatures to establish their own public policy limiting the
right to picket and strike. The State of Florida by the "Right-to-Work" con-
stitutional amendment and by the Legislature enacting the Florida Employ-
ment Peace Statute availed itself of the prerogative of creating a public policy
limiting the right to picket and strike. The limitations upon striking and
picketing created by constitutional amendment and by the Florida Employ-
ment Peace Statute are consistent with the limitations set forth in the Taft-
Hartley, Act. In the light of the existing public policy of Florida and the ac-
quiescence of the Supreme Court of the United States in recognizing the
rights of the various states to create their own public policy, there seems
ample grounds for reconsideration of the principles considered by the
Supreme Court of Florida in the case of Whitehead v. Miami Laundry. It
may well be that a further consideration by the Supreme Court of Florida
of these same issues might result in a reversal of this all important case.
61. Id. at 314.
